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Most empirical studies on decision-making start from a set of given options for action.
However, in everyday life there is usually no one asking you to choose between A, B,
and C. Recently, the question how people come up with options has been receiving
growing attention. However, so far there has been neither a systematic attempt to define
the construct of “option” nor an attempt to show why decision-making research really
needs this construct. This paper aims to fill that void by developing definitions of “option”
and “option generation” that can be used as a basis for decision-making research in a
wide variety of decision-making settings, while clarifying how these notions relate to
familiar psychological constructs.We conclude our analysis by arguing that there are indeed
reasons to believe that option generation is an important and distinct aspect of human
decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
The current literature on human decision-making is largely
focused on the question how people implement their goals by
deciding between different possibilities for action and translating
these decisions into action. Traditionally, empirical studies on
decision-making start from a set of options provided by the exper-
imenter. Participants are, for example, provided with a range of
buttons they can press; or they are asked to choose one from a set
of different objects, rewards, or possible solutions to a problem.
However, in everyday life there is usually no one asking you to
choose between A, B, and C (Woll, 2002; Smaldino and Richer-
son, 2012). For example, when you miss your train you need to
decide how you will spend the time until the next train arrives –
but the different options are not presented to you as buttons to
press. Rather, you have to generate these options yourself.
The focus in previous empirical research on externally provided
options means that there are questions concerning decision-
making that are frequently overlooked: how do people determine
what they can possibly do at any given moment? How do they
come up with “options” for action? Recently, these questions have
given rise to some theoretical papers (Kalis et al., 2008; Smaldino
and Richerson, 2012) and a small, but growing body of empirical
work on option generation (Keller and Ho, 1988; Klein et al., 1995;
Raab et al., 2009; Ward et al., 2011). However, so far there has been
no systematic attempt to define the notions of “option” or “option
generation.”This is problematic firstly because aswewill show, dif-
ferent authors implicitly use the terms in different ways, making
their results hard to compare. Althoughwedonot claim that every-
one studying option-generation mechanisms should use the same
definition, one of the aims of the current paper is to argue that
there are several aspects that any plausible definition of real-world
option generation should cover. Thereby, it should be clarified in
advance that the definitions we propose are not themselves based
on empirical findings (of which there are few), but that they are
grounded in a conceptual analysis of decision-making and should
be seen as normative guidelines for structuring future empirical
studies on option generation.
Secondly, unclarity about what these terms mean raises the
question whether these concepts are really needed – is it not the
case that everything interesting about option generation is already
covered by familiar constructs such as goals and plans? There-
fore, our second aim is to analyze to what extent decision-making
research really needs constructs such as “options” and “option
generation.”
The theoretical analysis developed in this paper aims to con-
tribute to existing stage models of decision-making (Heckhausen
and Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer, 1990; Ernst and Paulus, 2005;
Heckhausen andHeckhausen, 2008; Kalis et al., 2008). Thesemod-
els distinguish different stages or aspects of the decision-making
process. Stage models do not presuppose that decision-making
is a linear process; some argue instead that it consists of iter-
ative cycles, each cycle consisting of different phases (Maani and
Maharaj, 2004). In earlier work (Kalis et al., 2008), we briefly noted
that stage models might need to be expanded with an option-
generation stage; in this paper, we develop this proposal in full
detail. In the first sections of the paper, it will be argued that
although there is increasing attention in decision-making research
for the stages preceding evaluation and choice, different authors
use the terms “option” and “option generation” in different ways.
Also, it will be shown that existing research on option genera-
tion restricts itself to certain specific settings, thereby overlooking
major areas of decision-making. We will then propose definitions
of the terms “option” and “option generation” that can be used as
a basis for research in a wider variety of decision-making settings,
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while clarifying how these notions relate to familiar psychological
constructs. This analysis will make clear why option generation
should be seen as an important and distinct aspect of human
decision-making in real-life settings. The final part of the paper
provides suggestions on how to move forward in research on
option generation.
OPTION GENERATION: AN OVERVIEW
The literature on decision-making uses the terms “option” in at
least four different ways, differing in level of abstractness. A very
abstract notion of options can be found in, for example,Ward et al.
(2011), who define options as statements that are relevant to the
attainment of a certain goal. This means that in their view, options
can be predictions, desires, perceived possibilities, or plans, to
name just a few possibilities. In their empirical study, Ward et al.
(2011) examined the options generated by police officers in a sim-
ulated situation of potential threat. A statement like “I think the
suspect has a gun” is in their study counted as an option because
it is a statement that is relevant to the attainment of a certain goal
(namely preventing the suspect from using lethal violence).
A second,more restricted definition of options is found inwork
on hierarchical reinforcement learning. Here, the term “options”
refers to “abstract actions”: temporally extended sequences of
lower-level actions (Sutton et al., 1999; Botvinick et al., 2009). This
means that lower-level actions such as cutting an onion, getting
butter from the fridge, frying the onions, and so on can be grouped
into an option such as “making dinner.” This proposal aims to do
better justice to the hierarchical structure of action descriptions
and provides a framework for studying the role of reinforcement
learning in more complex forms of behavior.
Thirdly, problem-solving studies use the term “option” in an
even more restricted sense, referring to “steps that could be taken
in solving a problem”(Keller and Ho, 1988; Klein et al., 1995). The
range of options is then determined by the range of actions that
are allowed within the context of the problem. For example, in
their study on option generation in chess, Klein et al. (1995) asked
participants to generate possible moves in response to a certain
situation on the chess board. In this study, options are concep-
tualized as possible chess moves as judged by the participants.
Similarly, in solving a problem like the Tower of London (Shallice,
1982), options would be the different moves allowed within the
puzzle.
The most fine-grained notion of “options” can be found in the
work of Raab and colleagues (Johnson and Raab, 2003; Raab and
Johnson, 2007; Raab et al., 2009) on option generation in sports
situations. In their work, they investigate specific ways in which a
movement in a sports situation can be completed. In a study on
basketball, for example, the options measured are different ways to
throw a basketball with regard to “velocity, release angle and spin”
(Raab et al., 2009, p. 52). Their work aims to show that option
generation does not require elaborate cognitive processing and
can be understood by combining the theories of direct perception
(Michaels and Carello, 1981) and bounded rationality (Gigerenzer
and Selten, 2002).
This brief overview shows that the different areas of research
on option generation differ widely in focus; as said this makes the
results of different studies on option generation hard to compare.
One could ask whether a study that examines “statements relevant
to goal attainment” is really about the same thing as a study that
examines differentways to throwabasketball. Precisely because the
field of option generation is in an early stage, it seems important
to aim for clarity regarding the question what option generation
is, and what connects the different studies that examine it.
While one problem is that existing studies vary widely in their
use of the terms, another problem is that the areas of decision-
making covered in most existing studies on option generation
are limited. Almost all studies focus on decision-making situ-
ations that have stringent constraints (solving a chess problem,
judging a potentially violent situation as a police officer, throw-
ing a basketball). The most important reason for this seems
to be a methodological one: constraining the range of options
participants work with increases control over the experimental
situation. However, this also implies that the experimental set-
tings in which decision-making is studied are far removed from
everyday decision-making situations, where the range of options
is often wider and less strictly constrained than the range of pos-
sible moves in a chess problem or in sports. In order to be able to
cover also such underconstrained situations in empirical research,
it is first needed to see more clearly how options for action in
real life could be understood. Note that the proposal developed
below does not have the aim to replace current uses of the term
described above, but to provide amore systematic conceptual anal-
ysis of options and option generation that can be used in broad
areas of decision-making.
DEFINING OPTIONS
Before discussing option generation, we first want to focus on the
simple notion of an option. As said, we believe that there are two
aspects that any plausible definition should address. The first is
that (and this is in line with what has been implicitly assumed
in most empirical studies) an option for action should be under-
stood as a mental representation of something the agent could do:
as a representation of an action. In this respect, it differs from the
closely related notion of an affordance (Gibson, 1977; Norman,
1999) used in the fields of ecological psychology and human–
machine interaction. According to most authors, an affordance is
not a mental state, but an action possibility situated in between
a specific person and his/her environment. “Options” also have
a broader scope than affordances, as we might generate highly
abstract or future options that are not present in the environ-
ment. Acknowledging that an option is a mental state implies, for
example, that if one refers to options as “possible solutions to a
problem,” one should keep in mind that these are always possible
solutions seen from the point of view of the decision-maker. Of
course, options can vary widely in quality and feasibility; the point
made here is that something can be an option even if it is not an
objective possibility. Let us say that you generate the option of
going to see the Nachtwacht at the Rijksmuseum tomorrow, not
knowing that it will be closed. The fact that seeing the Nachtwacht
tomorrow is impossible does not mean that you did not generate
an option: it just means that you generated an option with zero
feasibility.
Secondly, an option is not just any representation of an action,
but an action representation one might decide on, and that one
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considers deciding on; it is a choice alternative. This means that
options should be distinguished from action representations that
are involved in, for instance, idly imagining a certain action taking
place. It also implies that contrary to what is sometimes stated in
the literature (Sprenger and Dougherty, 2012), option generation
is different from hypothesis generation, where one generates “pos-
sible explanations” for a certain event (Gettys and Fisher, 1979).
Although hypothesizing about, for example, the causes of a prob-
lem might certainly affect the options generated for solving the
problem, generating hypotheses has nothing to do with action.
Of course, the requirement that one sees an action representa-
tion as a choice alternative does not need to involve anything
like an explicit thought “I believe that I could decide to take a
cruise.” Also, taking something into consideration does not need
to happen consciously. The only requirement is that in order to be
an “option,” an action representation should play the implicit or
explicit psychological role of a candidate for action.
We thus, propose to define options as representations of can-
didates for goal-directed action. In the remainder of this section,
we would like to discuss two characteristics of options that play
an important role in existing work on option generation: the
fact that they are frequently organized in a hierarchical structure
and the fact that they have an “evaluative load.” As described in
Section “Option Generation: An Overview,” different uses of the
term “option” denote different units of analysis (sets of primitive
actions, primitive actions, or ways to perform primitive actions).
Building on existing stage models of decision-making combined
with the idea that action representations are structured in a hier-
archical way (Sutton et al., 1999; Manoel et al., 2002; Grafton and
Hamilton, 2007; Botvinick et al., 2009), it is plausible to think
that decision-making also has a hierarchical, tree-like structure
(Botvinick et al., 2009). In many unconstrained decision-making
situations, one might first decide on a general course of action
on the basis of various abstract options, after which the decision-
making process moves down to a more concrete level, involving
the consideration of more concrete options. For example, when
thinking about where to go on holiday, you might see various
options (going camping, going on a cruise, renting a cottage).
When that is decided upon, the next question (for instance, where
to rent a cottage?) might lead to the generation of more concrete
options for action (renting a cottage in France, in Germany, and
so on). At the most fine-grained level of analysis, options might be
different ways in which a certain movement may be performed, as
examined in the studies by Raab et al. (2009). Options, therefore,
should be seen as elements of a hierarchical structure of action
representations, ranging from the very abstract to the very spe-
cific, and ranging from options that can be performed here and
now to options that extend over time.
Finally, in most decision-making situations the options gen-
erated are not neutral representations of an action, but repre-
sentations that already carry a certain “evaluative load.” After all,
options play a role in decision-making: what is at stake is the
question what one prefers to do. Generating options is not the
same as trying to list all possible things one could do (standing
on your head, buying seven cans of tomatoes, buying eight cans
of tomatoes...). This does not mean that evaluation must be final-
ized during the phase of option generation: in most stage models,
the evaluation of options is considered to be a separate phase,
culminating in the selection of an option (Heckhausen and Goll-
witzer, 1987; Ernst and Paulus, 2005). However, work in ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1977) suggests that some kind of evaluation
might already be taking place while options they are being gener-
ated. Such “immediate evaluation”might be the result of processes
such as reward learning or somatic marker associations (Damasio,
1999). More specifically, we propose that two distinct values of
an option can be distinguished. The intrinsic value of an option
refers to the hedonic feeling associated with pursuing the option.
In contrast, the extrinsic value of an option refers to its instru-
mentality for achieving a particular goal (Vroom, 1964; Deci and
Ryan, 1985; Higgins and Trope, 1990). For example, for many
people practicing yoga has both a high intrinsic and a high extrin-
sic value because it is a relaxing activity which, at the same time,
serves to increase flexibility and health. In contrast, for most peo-
ple, running 10 kilometers in a cold rain has a low intrinsic value,
but may have a high extrinsic value for someone who is trying to
stay fit.
OPTIONS, GOALS, AND PLANS
Our proposal is thus to define options as representations of can-
didates for goal-directed action. This raises the question: how
does the construct relate to more traditional constructs from the
decision-making literature like goals and plans, and can it really
be distinguished from these existing constructs? In the previous
section, we already argued that options should be distinguished
from possibilities. We consider the range of possibilities to be
the range of action sequences that are physically possible for an
agent in the actual world. This notion of “possibility” is very sim-
ilar to the notion of an affordance (see above, and Gibson, 1977;
Michaels, 2003). Options, on the other hand, are representations
of perceived possibilities for action. The term “perceived possibil-
ity” implies that a decision-makermight bemistaken about what is
physically possible – but a representation of such an (incorrectly)
perceived possibility is nevertheless an option. In the rest of this
section, we will focus on goals and plans, and argue that what
distinguishes options from these concepts is their formal role in
the decision-making process: the formal role of an option is its
being a possible action that is taken into consideration (but not
yet decided upon).
GOALS
An influential definition by Austin and Vancouver (1996) states
that goals are:
“internal representations of desired states, where states are
broadly construed as outcomes, events, or processes. Internally
represented desired states range from biological set points for
internal processes (e.g., body temperature) to complex cognitive
depictions of desired outcomes. . . that span from the moment to
a life span and from the neurological to the interpersonal” (Austin
and Vancouver, 1996, p338).
On this view, a goal is understood as a kind of representation,
leaving room for a wide range of states differing in complexity and
abstractness. A more recent definition states that goals are “sub-
jectively desirable states of affairs that the individual intends to
attain through action” (Kruglanski and Kopetz, 2009, p. 29). Both
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definitions at first sight seem to lie very close to our proposed def-
inition of an option for action. The important thing to see here
is that whereas certain representational content (such as the rep-
resentational content “buy ice cream”) might figure in both goals
and options, options are different kinds of representations than
goals: both play different roles in the decision-making process.
There are two important differences. First, the second defini-
tionmentioned above refers to the fact that goals are states that one
intends to bring about. Of course this leaves room for the fact that
we might assign different values to different goals, and that some
of our goals might clash, leading to ambivalence; what is impor-
tant here is that in order for a possible state to be one of our goals,
we must at least have some prima facie intention to realize it. On
the other hand, with options this is not the case. Although options
do have some prima facie evaluative load, it is not the case that an
agent intends to realize every possibility that he or she sees. When
my goal is losing weight, I might come up with different options
for realizing that goal. I might start exercising daily, I might go on
a diet, I might apply for cosmetic surgery. The fact that I generate
those action representations as options does not mean that I want
to bring them about: I probably find some options more attractive
than others; what I want to do remains to be decided upon. The
second difference is that options are by definition representations
of actions, whereas goals are not. For example, one could adopt
a goal such as “being happy”: this goal is not the representation
of an action, but of a certain state of mind. Another example is
someone having the goal “the neighbor saying sorry for his rude
behavior.” This goal is not a representation of an action either, but
a representation of a certain external outcome.
PLANS
A second question is whether options are in any important sense
different from action plans. The literature on planning largely
focuses on planning as required for effective goal achievement.
Despite the numerous definitions of “plans” and “planning” in the
psychological literature, there is considerable convergence. Plans
can be defined as mental representations of behavioral sequences
for reaching a goal (Goel, 2002) or as cognitive structures that
allow an agent to transform his decision into action (Gollwitzer,
1990). In the same vein, the philosopher Michael Bratman devel-
oped an influential theory of planning, defining plans as coherent
structures of commitments that are directed toward the attain-
ment of a goal (Bratman et al., 1988; Bratman, 1989, 1999). Plans
as structures of commitments can be of varying complexity: a sim-
ple plan would be “take a different route to work today,”whereas a
complex plan would be “open a record store.” It is clear that plans
are thus related to goals: plans are strategies for reaching a goal,
and the structure of a plan is derived from the way in which the
different steps contribute to the fulfillment of the goal.
But do options differ from plans? After all, both options and
plans might be seen as strategies (i.e., means) for attaining a
goal. However, the literature on planning suggests that there are
some aspects in which plans are different from options. Firstly, a
plan is often considered to be something characterized by some
form of commitment (Bratman, 1999). In most stage models of
decision-making, plans come into play after one has selected a
certain option for action (Gollwitzer, 1990): a plan is an answer
to the question how to transform the selected option into action.
Exceptions are cases of planning that are not directly linked to a
decision, such as planning the day ahead. But even in such cases,
planning seems to be accompanied by an intention to actually
execute the plan (on the relation between plans and intentions,
see Pollack, 1990; Bratman, 1999). The only cases where plans are
made without a corresponding intention are cases of hypotheti-
cal planning such as: “if I were to rob a bank I would do it like
this. . .” – but even here one could argue that there is a “hypo-
thetical intention” involved. On the other hand, as said above
in the discussion about goals, seeing something as an option for
action does not imply any form of commitment or intention. Sec-
ondly, options are singular action descriptions (although these can
vary in complexity and be embedded in a hierarchical structure),
whereas plans consist of sequences of different steps that “guide”
a person toward the attainment of a goal (first I will do this, and
then I will do this, and then. . .). To conclude, while there is thus
overlap in the application of the terms “options” and “plans,” the
notion of an option refers to a perceived possibility that is taken
into consideration, whereas the notion of a plan generally refers
to a sequential structure of action steps characterized by a certain
commitment.
In sum, the main point so far has been that options are not
identified by a specific representational content: as we have seen
a representation with the content “start exercising daily” could be
either a goal, a plan, or an option.What distinguishes options from
goals and plans is their formal role in the decision-making process:
options are possible actions that are taken into consideration (but
not yet decided upon). Now thatwe knowhow to define the notion
of an option, the next question is: what could it mean to generate
options for action?
DEFINING OPTION GENERATION
The term“option generation”ismostly used very generally, to refer
to the idea that decision-makers come up with options as a result
of certain psychological processes. However, Raab et al. (2009), for
example, seem to distinguish option generation from option per-
ception, restricting the latter notion for those situations in which
one directly “sees” options in the environment. Notwithstand-
ing the importance of this research, at least on our definition of
options, the notion of option perception is not really appropriate:
when one defines options as mental representations, this implies
they are not merely part of the environment: even if the environ-
ment suggests (affords) a possibility, in order for that possibility
to become an option, some mental activity is needed. Therefore,
perception might be a misleading term. Our proposal is to define
option generation as the formation of mental representations of
candidates for goal-directed action. This basic definition does not
yet answer the question whether option generation should be seen
as a distinct psychological process, or whether processes such as
memory retrieval, problem solving, and so on provide us with
options, for which the term “option generation” is a shorthand
description. This unclarity is problematic because it makes it hard
to see whether we really need a new construct of option genera-
tion at all. In this section, we will develop a proposal on how to
analyze the concept of option generation; in the next section, it
will be argued that whereas option generation is probably not a
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separate psychological process, it nevertheless needs to be studied
in its own right.
The first problem is how to demarcate the “domain” of option
generation: is every action preceded by an option-generation pro-
cess? Or does option generation only take place when we are
consciously deliberating about what to do? It seems plausible to
say that there is option generation going on if and only if there is
decision-making about action going on. Given that options were
defined as representations of candidates for goal-directed action,
we are not concerned here with people generating possibilities that
are not related to action (such as generating possible events that
might happen in the future). Secondly, the demarcation criterion
implies that there is no option generation at work in behavior that
is completely automated, habitual, and stimulus-driven: for exam-
ple, if one sees a word in front of one’s eyes, one will automatically
read it (Stroop, 1935). In such situations, no decision-making is
involved1, and, therefore, no option generation takes place either.
However, just as there aremany formsof implicit decision-making,
this also applies to option generation. Option generation does
not need to take the form of conscious, explicit “thinking about
possibilities”; there are probably many types of real-life decision-
making where options just “pop into your head” or are directly
suggested by your environment. However, one might ask whether
the kind of processes studied in the work by Raab et al. (2009)
would really count as the generation of options on our proposed
definition. As said, Raab et al. (2009) investigated decision-making
in sports situations, for example, how people “generate and per-
ceive options for controlling rotation” (p. 57) in performing a
double somersault. Although the authors claim that such behavior
involves decision-making because it is goal-directed behavior, the
decision-making (and option generation) at stake here is certainly
of a highly implicit kind.
This leads to the question how different kinds of option-
generation situations could be distinguished. It seems fruitful to
place option-generation situations along a continuum that on the
one end has situations where decision-makers have an explicit goal
they are trying to attain, and, on the other hand, situations that
are completely open and not guided by any explicit goal. In a sit-
uation representing the first extreme, option generation amounts
to determining different possible means to attain an explicit goal.
This is thus the kind of top-down option generation usually stud-
ied in work on problem-solving: option generation in the context
of, for example, a chess problem (Klein et al., 1995), a parking
problem (Adelman et al., 1995), or as a response to one’s New
Year’s resolution to improve one’s work-life balance. In such situ-
ations, options are means to a certain end, and the question how
options are generated is also the question how means are adopted
(Kruglanski andKopetz,2009). On the other endof the continuum
are situations where there is no explicit goal: here the process of
option generation takes place in a bottom-up fashion and is much
less constrained. One possible example is the situation where you
unexpectedly have a free day in front of you (let us say you had
1However, a reader fluent in both Hebrew and English might still have to decide
between reading the word from left to right or from right to left. This shows that
even in many cases of apparently automatic behavior, some decision-making pro-
cess might be taking place (we are grateful to one of the reviewers for pointing
this out).
obligations that were canceled at the last moment) and you ask
yourself: what shall I do with my time? This type of option gen-
eration has so far hardly been studied at all, as it is particularly
difficult to examine in empirical research due to it being heavily
underconstrained: the agent not only needs to determine what he
could do, but also what he would like to achieve. Nevertheless,
this kind of option generation plays quite an important role in our
everyday life.
One might object that what happens in these latter cases is
that the agent first sets a goal. However, this seems an overly lin-
ear approach to the decision-making process. It does not seem
plausible to say that an agent always first needs to set a goal
before generating options. As Kruglanski and Kopetz, 2009, p.
35) argue: “a means may activate the corresponding goal.” Let us
say that while reflecting on your free day your eye falls on the
movie listings in the newspaper: this might activate your goal
of seeing that new movie with Angelina Jolie, and result in your
generating the option of going to the cinema. Option genera-
tion in such a situation consists in perceiving a certain affordance
or opportunity for action (namely, going to the cinema) in your
environment. This is likely the kind of example Raab et al. (2009)
may have had in mind when speaking of “option perception.”
However, strictly speaking, it is not the option that is perceived,
but the opportunity or affordance; the option itself is the men-
tal state resulting from such perceptual processes. It is important
to note that even though the agent in such situations does not
have an explicit goal, research so far suggests that option gen-
eration is probably strongly guided by the agent’s implicit goals,
preferences, or motives (Hassin et al., 2008; Custers and Aarts,
2010). After all, when you would have a dislike for movies, see-
ing the movie listings in the newspaper would not lead you to
generate the option of going to the cinema. Or to give another
example, individuals who have a high-affiliation motive will be
likely to generate affiliation-related options, such as calling a good
friend, whenever they have spare time. In contrast, individuals
who have a high-achievement motive will be more likely to gener-
ate achievement-related options, such asworking on amanuscript.
In these examples, there is no explicit goal, but option generation is
guided by implicit (i.e.,more or less unconscious) goals ormotives
(Schultheiss and Brunstein, 2010).
OPTION GENERATION, CREATIVE COGNITION, AND
PLANNING
As said, option generation is usually taken to refer to every pro-
cess that provides a decision-maker with options. So far none
of the studies on option generation claim that option generation
should be seen as a distinctly identifiable psychological process that
is completely independent of familiar processes such as memory
retrieval, perception, or problem-solving. Research so far suggests
that memory retrieval, in particular, plays a substantial role in
option generation (Klein et al., 1995; Johnson and Raab, 2003;
Kaiser et al., 2013). As noted by Kalis et al. (2008), it is likely that
the importance of each process depends on the familiarity and
complexity of the situation. Thus, it is plausible that in unfamiliar
or complex situations, option generation is more effortful, and,
therefore, relies more on processes associated with executive func-
tion, whereas in familiar or well-constrained situations, option
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generation requires less effort and might rely more on processes
associated with (more or less) automatic retrieval from long-term
memory. However, there is still reason to think that option gen-
eration cannot be understood just by looking at what is known
about those familiar processes. This is because in generating
options these processes play a certain specific role – namely the
role of providing agents with representations of possible choice
alternatives. This “role” can be clearly distinguished from the
role these processes have in other psychological contexts. For
example, when you are at the station with an hour to spare,
memory retrieval could very well play a part in how you gen-
erate options (visiting that coffee bar, buying a newspaper over
there, etc.). But how exactly and under what conditions mem-
ory plays such a role in everyday option generation might not be
found out just by studying memory retrieval in general. However,
one might object: could not option generation just be described
as a form of creative cognition or of planning? We will discuss
these processes and their relation to option generation in the next
section.
CREATIVE COGNITION
Creative cognition is generally accepted as having two defining
aspects: it is the generation of both novel and adequate products
of thinking (Sternberg, 1999; Dietrich, 2004;Ward,2007). Looking
at this definition, it becomes clear that option generation differs
from creative cognition in two important ways: creative cogni-
tion is always about generating novel products whereas option
generation is not, and option generation is always about action,
whereas creative cognition is not. Regarding the first point, it is of
course true that generating novel solutions or ideas might greatly
contribute to option generation. But there is no reason to think
that option generation requires creative thinking, nor that creative
thinking always leads to optimal option generation. Regarding
the second point: creative cognition might result in thoughts or
ideas that have nothing to do with actions. For example, the clas-
sic remote associates test (Mednick and Mednick, 1967) measures
creative cognition by asking subjects to generate associations in
response to a set of three words (such as, for example, the word
“plumber,”“tobacco,” and “tube,” which together suggest the word
“pipe”). The test measures subjects’ responses in terms of creative
insight and adequacy. This kind of cognitive task is completely
different from the task of generating options for action. There
are also creativity tasks that are more closely related to action: an
example is the Brick Test (Guilford et al., 1978), which requires
participants to list as many as possible uses for a brick. However,
even in this task what is measured is not how relevant the uses
generated are for a person’s goals, but how innovative they are. All
this naturally still allows for the fact that option generation might
very well lead to creative products of thinking: however, the formal
role of option generation clearly differs from the role of creative
cognition.
PLANNING
In the same vein, option generation differs from planning. In most
cases of planning, agents are implementing a certain decision (for
exceptions, see Plans): the question at stake in planning is how
to realize one’s goals in action. This means that in contrast to
option generation, planning is characterized by commitment to a
choice of action (Bratman, 1999). However, given what was said
earlier about iterative cycles of decision-making and the hierar-
chical structure of action representation, planning might in turn
“require” option generation. This can be illustrated with an earlier
example: having decided to rent a cottage (and thus, planning to
rent a cottage), you might, in turn, need to generate options with
respect to the question where to rent a cottage. However, in such
cases, the agent is not committed to the options generated (a cot-
tage in France, in Spain, etc.) even though he is committed to the
general plan “renting a cottage.” One could say that the “type” of
option generation probably shifts as the decision-making process
proceeds: in the early stages of deciding about something like a
holiday almost everything is open: in this stage, option generation
will probably be relatively unconstrained and bottom-up. In later
stages, when the decision-making has progressed to a more con-
crete level (it has been decided what type of holiday, and what type
of destination), option generation becomes more constrained and
top-down, guided by the goals that have been set in earlier stages.
CONCLUSION
According to our proposal, research on option generation could
find a common conceptual starting point in the idea that options
are mental representations of candidates for goal-directed action.
Option-generation processes are proposed to be those cognitive
processes fulfilling a specific role in the decision-making process,
namely providing the agent with such representations. In this final
section, we hope to show how these definitions could provide a
sound basis for empirical studies on everyday option generation.
Firstly, by defining options as mental representations and not
conceivable possibilities, the question comes to the fore how we
come from all conceivable possibilities to things seen as options.
At any point in time, there is an almost infinite number of things
we could do. Nevertheless, we do not consider most of them as
options for action (Galotti, 2007; Smith, 2010; Smaldino andRich-
erson, 2012). What kind of constraints are applied here? And why
do some people apply stricter constraints than others? One might
hypothesize that differences in the personality trait “openness to
experience” (McCrae and John, 1992; McCrae, 1996) would corre-
spond to differences in constraints applied in option generation:
some people just see more options than others.
Secondly, our proposal has been to demarcate the domain of
option generation by seeing it as an aspect of decision-making,
thus excluding fully habituated and automated types of cognition.
This of course still leaves open the question: when do we speak of
decision-making? This is a question that cannot be solved within
the scope of the present paper – in fact, it might not have a clear-
cut answer at all. However, given our aim to develop a theoretical
basis for research on everyday decision-making, we believe that
the focus of option-generation research should be on situations
that are clear cases of decision-making: thus, on situations where
we can ask ourselves: what could I do?
If we start from such a conceptual basis, how should research
on option generation proceed? As is being acknowledged by those
working in this field (Galotti, 2007; Raab et al., 2009), the next
hurdle to take is to develop option-generation studies encompass-
ing a higher level of real-world complexity: thus, studying everyday
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decision-making situations that are heavily underconstrained. As
a first step, we have recently developed an experimental paradigm
in which participants are asked to generate options for simple
real-world scenarios2, and to subsequently decide among the
generated options (Kaiser et al., 2013). Our results show that deci-
sions between self-generated options can be clearly distinguished
on both the behavioral and the neural level fromdecisions between
externally provided options. These findings provide empirical
support for our claim that we need to be cautious when trans-
ferring the results of previous studies in which participants had
to decide between options provided by the experimenter to real-
life situations where individuals decide between self-generated
options. Furthermore, in order to approach real-world complex-
ity, it is important to develop paradigms that work with the
decision-maker’s own goals. So far, most empirical paradigms on
the processes mentioned above work with goals that are provided
by the experimenter.
In addition, the question how different psychological processes
fulfill the task of providing an agent with options for action, and
which processes are involved in which kinds of option generation,
are largely unstudied. One of the major questions, therefore, is
how these different processes interact in the generation of options
for action. What determines whether options are generated from
memory, automatic perceptual processes, or by creative cogni-
tion? How do situations where a goal is given, differ in this respect
from situations where the agent does not have a clear goal? What
does option generation look like in cases of conscious (effortful)
decision-making, compared to more automatic (effortless) forms
of decision-making?
More generally, option generation sets the constraints for the
decision-making process as a whole: if you do not see that a cer-
tain actual possibility is an option, you will never be able to act
on this possibility. This means that the options we generate (or
do not generate) partially determine the quality of the decision
that will be made (Sprenger and Dougherty, 2012). This is impor-
tant because in generating options for action, decision-makers
do not attempt to generate as much or as crazy options as
2To give an example, one of the scenarios used was: “You have missed your train. You
have to wait for one hour until the next train leaves. What could you do?” (Kaiser
et al., 2013).
possible: they try to generate those options that enable them to
make good decisions. Therefore, an important question is how
different factors affect option quality. This is particularly rele-
vant for the study of dysfunctional decision-making: is it, for
example, possible to identify dysfunctional processes of option
generation in terms of either the quantity (too many, or too
few) or the quality of options generated (cf. Kalis et al., 2008)?
And if so, how do such dysfunctional processes play a role
in different psychopathological symptoms related to decision-
making?
Finally, another promising avenue for research is to study the
role of option generation in the everyday phenomenology of
agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002; De Vignemont and Fourneret,
2004; David et al., 2008). For example, it is possible that our
sense of agency might be stronger if one is acting on the basis of
self-generated options than if one is choosing between externally
provided options. After all, what seems characteristic about our
experience of making decisions is that we do not merely choose
between different things that are presented to us: we can at least
some of the time actively come up with ideas about things we
could do. So far, attention has been focused on the role of choos-
ing or deciding as being important for a sense of free agency: “I
feel free because I can choose between different things.” Research
on option generation, however, might indicate that option gen-
eration provides another important aspect of the experience of
free agency: “I feel free because I can see different possibilities.”
Clearly, future research is called for to better understand the pro-
cesses underlying option generation and the intricate relationship
between options, goals, and plans. We hope that our paper serves
to stimulate further research in this largely uncharted territory of
human decision-making.
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